Volume 74
Issue 2 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 74,
1969-1970
1-1-1970

The Assistance of Counsel and The Warren Court: Post-Gideon
Develoments in Perspective
Otis H. Stephens Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra

Recommended Citation
Otis H. Stephens Jr., The Assistance of Counsel and The Warren Court: Post-Gideon Develoments in
Perspective, 74 DICK. L. REV. 193 (1970).
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol74/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu.

The Assistance of Counsel and
the Warren Court: Post-Gideon
Developments in Perspective*

OTIS H. STEPHENS, JR.**

I. Introduction
II. The Assistance of Counsel PrecedingArraignment
III. The Assistance of Counsel After Conviction
IV. Other Dimensions of the Assistance of Counsel
V. Conclusion
I.
Much controversy

INTRODUCTION

over

the performance

of the

"Warren

Court"1 in the area of criminal procedure has focused on decisions
expanding the constitutional

right to the assistance of counsel.

During the tenure of the Honorable Earl Warren as Chief Justice
of the United States, the Supreme Court identified a number of
"critical" stages in the criminal process from custodial interrogation
to appeal and held that irrespective of a defendant's financial resources, the services of a defense attorney must be made available
at each of these stages. Few have disagreed with Mr. Justice
Hugo L. Black's assertion that the ideal of justice cannot be
* This Article was prepared under a grant provided by the Faculty
Research Fund of the University of Tennessee.
** A.B., University of Georgia, 1957; M.A., 1958; Ph.D., Johns
Hopkins University, 1963; Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Tennessee.
1. A name commonly used to refer to the United States Supreme
Court during the tenure of the Honorable Earl Warren as Chief Justice of
the United States, October 5, 1953, to June 23, 1969.

achieved "where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the
amount of money he has."'2 At the same time, many critics of the
Supreme Court have expressed alarm over its departure from traditional views about the dimensions of the adversary system. In
recent years a Supreme Court majority has recognized that, as a
practical matter, the adversary system often goes into operation
well in advance of the filing of formal charges' and in many cases
extends beyond the trial itself to an initial appeal of the con4
viction.
In attempting to assure access to defense counsel at "critical"
stages in the criminal process, the Supreme Court has frequently
objected to various methods of police investigation widely practiced
throughout the country. In Miranda v. Arizona,5 for example,
Mr. Chief Justice Warren bluntly asserted that "the very fact of
custodial interrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty
and trades on the weakness of individuals."'6 He was not referring
specifically to the "third degree" or to any particular form of
direct police pressure, but rather to the practice of private interrogation as a technique of law enforcement. It is not surprising that
such criticism, accurate or otherwise, has aroused strong resentment in law enforcement circles-resentment that has often taken
the form of a bitter counterattack in which the Supreme Court is
portrayed as a collective coddler of criminals. To many police
officers such decisions as Escobedo v. Illinois7 and Miranda v.

Arizona8 probably appear as nothing more than attempts on the
part of nonprofessionals, with misplaced concern for the rights of
criminals, to foul up the machinery of law enforcement.9 The
prosecutor, whose professional reputation may be identified with
a conviction rate, is likely to hold similar views. In any event
there is widespread opposition among law enforcement officials to
a form of appellate review in which police error often leads to the
reversal of convictions irrespective of the evidence of guilt. 10
Strong opposition to Supreme Court rulings in the field of
criminal procedure has also been voiced by many individuals and
groups within the general public. One study shows a marked increase between 1964 and 1966 in public awareness of Supreme
2.
3.
infra.
4.
infra.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
Cases cited and discussed at notes 39-80 and accompanying text
Cases cited and discussed at notes 81-113 and accompanying text

384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Id. at 455-56.
378 U.S. 478 (1964).
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
See generally J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC Socimr (1966).
10. See Kamisar, On the Tactics of Police-Prosecution Oriented
Critics of the Court, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 436 (1964).
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Court activity in the field of criminal procedure, 1' and title II
of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 196812 reflects intense anti-Court sentiment in Congress that apparently
received substantial popular support.13 It should be noted that
some of the Warren Court's most far-reaching efforts to extend
procedural safeguards to indigent, uninformed and inexperienced
defendants occurred during a period marked by assassination, urban riots and a highly publicized increase in the rate of violent
crimes generally. At such a time, popular reaction can be expected to go beyond the merits of particular cases or exact questions of procedure and to be expressed in sweeping denunciations
of the Court. In addition it is well to remember that much of the
criticism directed toward decisions involving criminal procedure
may chiefly result from long-standing dissatisfaction with judicial performance in other areas, notably public school desegregation and subversive activities.
Whatever its causes, criticism of the Warren Court, and especially of its decisions respecting criminal procedure, led to a
confrontation that some compared with the "court-packing" episode
of 1937.14 In June, 1968, Congress enacted and President Johnson
signed legislation aimed at overturning Supreme Court decisions on
police interrogation and line-up identification, as applied to federal
cases. ' 5 The successful effort to block Senate confirmation of the
nomination of Abe Fortas as Chief Justice of the United States
reflected, among other things, the same hostile sentiment. Supreme Court performance in the realm of criminal procedure was a
widely publicized issue in the 1968 presidential campaign. President Nixon's recent appointment of Warren E. Burger as the new
Chief Justice of the United States and his consecutive nominations of Judges Clement H. Haynsworth and G. Harrold Carswell
11. Murphy and Tanenhaus, Public Opinion and the United States
Supreme Court: A Preliminary Mapping of Some Prerequisites for Court
Legitimation of Regime Changes, 2 LAW & Soc'y REv. 357, 362 (1968).
See generally McIntyre, Public Attitudes Toward Crime and Law Enforcement, 374 ANNALS 34 (1967).

12. Act of June 19, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. II, § 3501A, 82 Stat. 210.
13. See Stephens, Police Interrogation and the Supreme Court: An
Inquiry into the Limits of Judicial Policy-Making, 17 J. PUB. L. 241, 250-52,
254-55 (1968).
14. See New York Times, May 26, 1968, § 4, at E-15.
15. Deleted from the original Senate version of this measure were
much broader restrictions on federal judicial power. One of these sought
to abolish the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and lower federal courts
to review decisions of the highest state courts admitting confessions into
evidence on grounds of voluntariness. See S. 917, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., tit.
II as reported by the Committee on the Judiciary, April 29, 1968.

to fill the vacancy created by the resignation of Mr. Justice Fortas
have been widely interpreted as further reflection of dissatisfaction with judicial trends of the recent past.
Some members of Congress have alleged a direct causal relationship between Supreme Court decisions-several of them in the
right-to-counsel area-and a rising crime rate.'
Apart from the
vast oversimplification implicit in such a charge, this contention is
in sharp conflict with the findings of empirical studies designed
to assess the impact of new police interrogation requirements on
the day-to-day administration of criminal justice. 7 It is true that
these studies are not conclusive and that very little systematic
examination of the impact of other procedural rules has been undertaken. Nevertheless, there is little if any support for the
contention that Supreme Court decisions have contributed to an increase in crime or even that they have resulted in the release of a
significant number of "known criminals."'
More important than the validity of such claims, however, is
their wide appeal and the intensity with which they are advanced.
Several recent decisions aimed at protection of the rights of indigents, chiefly by facilitating their access to counsel, are among
the most controversial rulings in the modem history of the Supreme Court. 19 Ironically, this is true even though such decisions
do not benefit leaders of organized crime who have ready access
to skilled legal counsel, or affluent suspects outside the ranks of
organized crime. Even assuming for the moment that these decisions have been implemented on a widespread basis, the persons
most likely to be materially affected are poor, uneducated, or in
some other way at a serious disadvantage when compared with
other defendants.
In addition to the broad social and political factors already
noted, further insight into the controversy surrounding these decisions may be derived from examining (1) the substance and
scope of recent extensions of procedural rights, (2) the Supreme
16. See 114 CONG. REC. 4749, 5827 (daily ed. May. 17, 1968) (remarks
of Senator McClellan); Hearings on S. 674 Before the Subcom. on Criminal
Laws and Procedures of the Committee on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess., at 192 (1967).
17. See Medalie, Zietz, & Alexander, Custodial Police Interrogation
in Our Nation's Capital: The Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 MICH.
L. REV. 1347 (1968); Seeburger & Wettick, Miranda in Pittsburgh-A Statistical Study, 29 U. PITr. L. Rrv. 1 (1967); Interrogations in New Haven:
The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519 (1967). See also THE IMPACT
or SUPREME CouRT DECISIONS 149-75 (T. Becker ed. 1969).
18. For a comprehensive analysis of factors generally identified with
the apparent increase of various types of crime in recent years see THE
CIIALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY, A REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION

ON

LAW

ENFORCEMENT AND

ADMINISTRATION

OF JusTIcE

(1967).
19. For an indication of the intensity of controversy in this area see

Hearings on S.674 Before the Subcom. on Criminal Laws and Procedures
of the Committee on the Judiciary,90 Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
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Court's stated reasons, constitutional and otherwise, for the enlargement of these rights, and (3) the implications of recent decisions for the administration of criminal justice in general and for
the adversary system in particular. This study focuses on these
three questions by analyzing the Warren Court's development of
the constitutional right to the assistance of counsel from its landmark 1963 decision in Gideon v. Wainwright2 0 through the close
of its final term on June 23, 1969. The heated debate over the
Court's performance in this area may be more clearly understood
by identifying the dimensions of the new requirements and by
examining major policy implications underlying them. The purpose here is to analyze and evaluate judicial performance, as reflected primarily in Supreme Court opinions.
The Warren Court regarded the assistance of counsel as an
indispensable prerequisite to the exercise of other rights that have
also been broadened in recent years. In particular the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and the sixth amendment
right of confrontation have been closely identified with the right
to counsel.2 1 Consequently, it would be a mistake to view the
growth of this protection merely as one of several independent
threads of development. The close inter-connections between the
right to counsel and several other provisions of the Bill of Rights
are reflected in many of the cases examined in the following
pages.
With its decision in Gideon v. Wainwright22 the Supreme Court
erased virtually all differences between the scope of the right to
counsel as applied by the sixth amendment to federal prosecutions 23 and as applied to the states by the fourteenth amendment.
During the twenty years preceding this decision, the Supreme
Court had used the due process rationale of Betts v. Brady24 to
determine the indigent defendant's right to be provided with
counsel in non-capital cases arising from the states. With its
emphasis on "an appraisal of the totality of facts" in each case,
the Betts standard permitted great flexibility of judicial interpretation. 25 This flexibility, of course, was accompanied by
confusion and uncertainty, but the general drift of Supreme Court
decisions tended to widen the right to counsel as an element of due
20.

372 U.s. 335 (1963).

21. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Brookhart v. Janis,
384 U.S. 1 (1966); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
22.

372 U.S. 335 (1963).

23.
24.
25.

Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
316 U.S. 455 (1942).
Id. at 462.

process. 2e Rejecting the Betts approach altogether, the Warren
Court in Gideon v. Wainwright held that the assistance of counsel
in criminal prosecutions is essential to a fair trial and that this
fundamental right is fully guaranteed in state courts by the fourteenth amendment. Writing for the majority, Mr. Justice Black,
a long-time advocate of this position, 27 recognized "that in our
adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court,
who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial
unless counsel is provided for him."'28 Although the Supreme
Court's language is not altogether clear on this point, the Gideon
requirement has apparently been applied only to felony cases,
leaving very much in doubt the scope of the right to counsel in
29
trials for minor offenses.
Since the Gideon case, the Supreme Court has added little of
constitutional significance to the right to counsel at trial. 0 In general the same may be said of the right to counsel at the preliminary hearing where the suspect is formally charged and requested to enter a plea. As early as 196131 the Warren Court gave
limited formal recognition to the right to counsel at the critical
preliminary hearing stage. The Court broadened the requirement in White v. Maryland,32 decided just over a month after
announcement of the Gideon ruling.33 However, as previously
noted, at the stages of police interrogation, lineup identification,
and appeal, some far-reaching developments have occurred. It is
clear in retrospect that Gideon v. Wainwright,34 with its emphasis
on a broad right to the assistance of counsel, and on uniform
requirements for state and federal cases, paved the way for most
if not all of the subsequent changes.
26. See W.

BEANEY,

THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN

CouRTs,

ch. 5 (1955).
27. See, e.g., his dissenting opinion in Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455,
474-77 (1942).
28. 372 U.S. at 344.
29. See Annot., 18 L. Ed. 2d 1420 (1967); Note, The Indigent Misdemeanant's Right to Counsel--an Extension of Gideon v. Wainwright, 18
DRAKE L. REV. 109 (1968); Comment, Constitutional Law-Right to Counsel--Valid Misdemeanor Conviction Cannot be used as Basis for Recidivist
Sentence if Defendant Was Not Represented by Counsel at Misdemeanor
Trial, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1012 (1968). For a detailed analysis of the Gideon
case, its origins, argument before the Supreme Court, immediate aftermath, and general implications, see A. LEwIs, GIDEON'S TRUMPET (1964).
30. One development should be noted, however. In Burgett v. Texas,
389 U.S. 109 (1967) a divided Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Douglas,
held that ina trial involving recidivist statutes, a prior Tennessee conviction obtained in violation of the Gideon requirement was inadmissible.
"To permit a conviction in violation of Gideon v. Wainwright to be used
against a person either to support guilt or enhance punishment for another
offense ... isto erode the principle of that case." 389 U.S. at 115.
31. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
32. 373 U.S. 59 (1963).
33. See also Walton v.Arkansas,371 U.S. 28 (1962).
34. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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Besides its recognition of the right to counsel at various stages
in the criminal process, the Warren Court extended this guarantee to other types of cases. Of particular importance is the
famous 1967 decision of In re Gault.35 Eight justices agreed that,
in juvenile delinquency proceedings leading to possible confinement in a state institution, a child is entitled under due process of
law to the assistance of counsel, either retained or appointed. 6
The ensuing discussion touches on this extension of the right to
counsel but gives more attention to changing requirements within
8 7
the formal criminal process.
Although the emphasis here is on expansion of the right to
counsel, it should be remembered that the Supreme Court's postGideon decisions have not uniformly broadened this constitutional
guarantee. On occasion the Warren Court in fact placed limits
either on a right to the presence of counsel or on the alternatives
available to a suspect, whether or not he is advised by a lawyer.38
Amid controversy over judicial enlargement of constitutional
rights, it is easy to lose sight of such limitations, but they too merit
attention as an aspect of the Warren Court's performance in the
criminal procedure field.
II.

THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL PRECEDING ARRAIGNMENT

In a series of closely divided decisions, the Warren Court, between 1964 and 1967, extended the right to counsel to stages of
police investigation traditionally thought to be outside the adversary system. First in Escobedo v. Illinois39 the Court held that, in
an investigation which has "begun to focus on a particular suspect" 40 who has been taken into custody and questioned, refusal
to allow him to consult his attorney violates his sixth amendment right to the assistance of counsel, as applied to the states
35.
36.

387 U.S. 1 (1967).
Id.

37. For a comprehensive discussion of various aspects of the Gault
ruling see Symposium on Juvenile Problems: In re Gault, 43 IND. L.J.
523 (1968). See also Davidson, In re Gault: The Juvenile's Gideon, 56
ILL. B.J. 488 (1968); Fort, Gault: Adversity or Opportunity, 51 JUDICATURE
53 (1967); Case Comment, 44 NorE DAME LAWYER 158 (1968).

38. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1967); Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
39. 378 U.S. 478 (1964). For a detailed discussion of the historical
antecedents of the Escobedo decision see Comment, An Historical Argument for the Right to Counsel During Police Interrogation, 73 YALE L.J.
1000 (1964). But cf. Enker & Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v.
United States and Escoebdo v. Illinois, 49 MINN. L. REv. 47 (1964).
40. 378 U.S. at 490-91.

by the fourteenth amendment. 41 Because the ruling in Escobedo
V. Illinois was confined to the particular set of circumstances appearing in the record, its exact requirements and dimensions were
very much in doubt. One important point seemed clear, however;
the Supreme Court had largely abandoned the traditional due
process standard by which it had frequently determined the admissibility of confessions and admissions as evidence in state
courts. Just as Gideon v. Wainwright42 had supplanted the Betts
v. Brady45 rationale, so the Escobedo decision appeared to replace
the case-by-case approach that the Supreme Court had followed
since 1936 in dealing with the problem of coerced confessions. 44 In
both areas a highly flexible due process standard had been dropped
in favor of a broad endorsement of access to defense counsel in
45
state proceedings.
With its decision two years later in Miranda v. Arizona,46 the
Court attempted to dispel the confusion produced by the Escobedo
ruling. The majority of five, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice
Warren, held that "the prosecution may not use statements,
whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against selfincrimination. '47 Minimum rquirements for assuring these safeguards were summarized as follows:
Prior to any questioning the person must be warned that he
has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does
make may be used as evidence against him, and that he
has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained
or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of
these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily,
41. One month prior to Escobedo the Supreme Court held that a defendant was deprived of his right to counsel by the admission into evidence of incriminating statements made in the absence of his attorney.
The statements were made during a conversation with an alleged confederate who had consented to install a radio transmitter in the defendant's
automobile, thereby enabling a federal narcotics agent to overhear everything that was said. Unlike the situation in Escobedo, this incident occurred after indictment, while the defendant was free on bail. Nevertheless
it dealt with the same broad question, the admissibility of statements
elicited from the accused in the absence of his attorney. Massiah v. United
States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
42. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
43. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
44. For a discussion of the pre-Escobedo approach to confessions see
Ritz, Twenty-five Years of State Criminal Confession Cases in the United
States Supreme Court, 19 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 35 (1962); Spanogle, The
Use of Coerced Confessions in State Courts, 17 VAND. L. REV. 421 (1964);
Stephens, The Fourteenth Amendment and Confessions of Guilt: Role of
the Supreme Court, 15 MERCER L. REV. 309 (1964); Way, The Supreme
Court and State Coerced Confessions, 12 J. PUB.L. 53 (1963).
45. See generally W. SCHAEFER, THE SUSPECT AND SOCIETY: CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE AND CONVERGING CONSTITUTIONAL

46.
47.

384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Id. at 444.

DocTRIsuS 10-26 (1966).
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knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in
any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes
to consult with an attorney before speaking, there can be
no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and
indicates in any manner that he does not 48wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him.
From a technical standpoint the emphasis of the Miranda decision differed from that of Escobedo. The latter ruling was based
largely on the sixth amendment right to the assistance of counsel,
while the former relied principally on the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Despite this apparent shift in
constitutional emphasis, the Miranda majority regarded the "presence of counsel" as the "adequate protective device" by which
police interrogation could be brought into conformity with requirements of the fifth amendment. 49 Of course the significance
accorded to the presence of a lawyer during police questioning
underscored the Court's expression of distrust as to what took
place at private sessions of stationhouse interrogation. The Supreme Court had long been concerned about the problem of the
"third degree" and about more subtle forms of psychological coercion often used to obtain incriminating statements. .0 But in the
Escobedo and Miranda cases, a majority of the Justices were raising
questions about the very existence of a system that permitted
exertion of official pressure on a suspect to obtain evidence in a
manner that would be unacceptable if conducted in open court.51
This doubt was revealed by Mr. Justice Goldberg's assertion in Escobedo that:
No system worth preserving should have to fear that if an
accused is permitted to consult with a lawyer, he will
become aware of, and exercise, these rights. If the exercise
of constitutional rights will thwart the effectiveness of a
system of law enforcement,
then there is something very
52
wrong with that system.
Apparently the Warren Court assumed that the deficiency in
the law enforcement system noted by Mr. Justice Goldberg could
48.
49.
50.
309 U.S.

Id. at 444-45.
Id. at 466.
See Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949); Chambers v. Florida,
227 (1940); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). See also
Paulsen, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Third Degree, 6 STAN. L. REv.
411 (1954).

51. This aspect of the problem of law enforcement within a constitutional framework is critically examined in Kamisar, Equal Justice in the

Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal Procedure, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OUR TIME 1 (A. Howard ed. 1965).
See also Sutherland, Crime
and Confession, 79 HARV. L.REv. 21 (1965).
52. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 489 (1964).

be remedied by the conversion of the system into something more
closely resembling the adversary system. To most judges and lawyers the Court's assumption of the corrective quality of the adversary system might seem altogether reasonable. Members of
the law enforcement profession, however, could hardly be expected
to acknowledge that police methods are so deficient as to require
the surveillance of the legal profession. In his dissent in Escobedo v. Illinois,53 Mr. Justice Stewart took issue with the majority's
assumptions concerning police methods. He drew a sharp distinction between criminal investigations and what he called "adversary litigative proceedings," insisting that the constitutional provisions in question were applicable only to the latter.54 "Supported
by no stronger authority than its own rhetoric," the majority of
the Court had, according to Mr. Justice Stewart, converted "a
routine police investigation of an unsolved murder into a distorted
analogy of a judicial trial."' 5
Perhaps anticipating the renewed criticism that the Miranda
decision would produce, the Court softened its immediate effect
by declaring one week after deciding Miranda that the rulings
in Miranda v. Arizona and Escobedo v. Illinois would not be
applied retroactively.5 6 Here, for the first time, the parallel with
Gideon v. Wainwright 7 ended, Gideon having been given full
retroactive effect. 58 While doubt still remains as to the precise
scope of the Miranda decision, the Court indicated two years later,
in Mathis v. United States,5 9 that the new interrogation requirements are not confined merely to traditional stationhouse questioning. This view was reiterated in the 1969 decision of Orozco v.
Texas6 ° Here the Court held that the Miranda requirements applied to statements made by a suspect in his own bedroom immediately after he was taken into custody by the police. 61 At the
same time the Supreme Court has continued to rule upon con53. Id. at 493-95 (dissenting opinion).
54. Id. at 494 (dissenting opinion).
55. Id.
56, Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966); cf. Frazier v. Cupp,
394 U.S. 731 (1969). See also Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966).
In Jenkins v. Delaware, 395 U.S. 213 (1969) the Court held that Miranda
requirements do not apply to the retrial of a defendant whose first trial
began prior to June 13, 1966, the date of the Miranda decision.
57. 372 U.S. 355 (1963).
58. See Doughty v. Maxwell, 376 U.S. 202 (1964); Pickelsimer v.
Wainwright, 375 U.S. 2 (1963); cf. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 628
n.13 (1965).
59. 391 U.S. 1 (1968).
60. 394 U.S. 324 (1969).
61. It should be noted that Mr. Justice Harlan, who strongly dissented
from the Miranda and Mathis rulings, concurred in Orozco "purely out
of respect for stare decisis ...." 89 S. Ct. at 1097 (concurring opinion).
He added, however, that "the constitutional condemnation of this perfectly
understandable, sensible, proper, and indeed commendable piece of police
work highlights the unsoundness of Miranda." Id.
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fession cases originating prior to Escobedo and thus not covered
by the new standards.62 In so doing it has relied explicitly on the
due process approach to confession admissibility in state courts.6 3
While, in a formal sense, this procedure is fully consistent with the
non-retroactivity of Escobedo and Miranda, it is interesting that
the Supreme Court has found occasion, since the latter decision,
64
to restate in some detail the old "voluntariness" criteria.
Although Miranda v. Arizona was more specific in its formal
requirements than earlier Supreme Court decisions on police interrogation, it left several questions unanswered and presented
some new difficulties. Of particular concern is the Warren Court's
implicit assumption concerning the presence of counsel as a "protective device" at the interrogation stage. Can this stage be sharply
separated from the earlier stage at which a suspect is given his
warnings and required to decide whether he wants a lawyer? In
other words, can an uncounseled suspect "knowingly and intelligently" waive his right to counsel during interrogation? 65 Furthermore, the Court in Miranda did not indicate the manner in
which counsel for indigent suspects should be selected. Apparently the suspect would have some choice in the matter, but if he
expressed no preference, who should then designate the suspect's
attorney and what criteria would be employed? The basic question raised by the Miranda decision is whether the objectionable
features of private police questioning are significantly modified
by the constitutional requirements of warnings and waiver. Substantial data support the general conclusion that few changes in
traditional patterns of interrogation have occurred since the decision.6 6 Broad evaluation of a Supreme Court decision, however,
62. See, e.g., cases cited note 63 infra.
63. See Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969); Darwin v. Connecticut,
391 U.S. 346 (1968); Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 519 (1968); Brooks
v. Florida, 389 U.S. 413 (1967); Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35 (1967);
Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707 (1967).

64. The Court also refused recently to consider the possible applica-

tion of the Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), and Escobedo
rulings to the admissibility of statements obtained by an "undercover
agent" who was placed in jail with the suspect to elicit information
about a murder. Without comment, the Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. People v. Miller, 392 U.S. 616 (1968).
Mr. Justice Marshall, joined by Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice
Douglas and Mr. Justice Brennan, dissented. Cf. Biggers v. Tennessee,
390 U.S. 404 (1968).
65. See generally Elsen & Rosett, Protections for the Suspect Under
Miranda v. Arizona, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 645 (1967).
66. See Medalie, Zietz & Alexander, Custodial Police Interrogation
in Our Nation's Capital: The Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 MicH.
L. REv. 1347 (1968); Seeburger & Wettick, Miranda in Pittsburgh-A Sta-

involves more than assessment of its immediate implementation.
Parallels in such areas as racial desegregation and school prayer
are readily apparent.6 7 Perhaps the Miranda decision is more
important as an enlargement of the ideal of equal justice than as a
practical basis of reform in police methods.
One year after the Miranda ruling, the Warren Court extended the right to counsel to police lineup identifications.6, Recognizing that this form of eyewitness identification is susceptible
to a variety of improper influences, the Court once more indicated
its confidence in the capacity of the legal profession to shield a suspect from improper police methods. Writing for a sharply divided
Court in United States v. Wade,6 9 Mr. Justice Brennan conceded
that the "risks" of lineup identification resulted not so much from
"police procedures intentionally designed to prejudice an accused,"
but rather from "the dangers inherent in eyewitness identification
and the suggestibility inherent in the context of the pretrial identification. '70 Like police interrogation, the lineup was seen as a "critical" stage in the criminal process. At this "pretrial confrontation,"
and possibly at similar instances of eyewitness identification not
precisely covered by the term "lineup," the presence of a lawyer
was required unless intelligently waived. The close kinship with
interrogation requirements was also evident in the Court's refusal
to give retroactive effect to the lineup rulings. 71 The Court acknowledged that the absence of a lawyer might be less crucial
72
during "confrontation for identification" than at the trial itself.

Thus various stages in the criminal process might be regarded as
"critical," but obviously some stages were less "critical" than others
when it came to the specific application of a constitutional standard. Dissenting in Stovall v. Denno,7 8 Mr. Justice Black sharply
objected to such distinctions. Once having determined "what the
Constitution says," Mr. Justice Black felt that the Supreme Court
could not in the light of "countervailing interests . . . legislate a

timetable by which the Constitution's provisions shall become ef74
fective."
tistical Study, 29 U. PITr. L. REv. 1 (1967); Interrogations in New Haven:
The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519 (1967). See also THE IMPACT
OF SUPREME COURT DEcisioNs, 149-75 (T. Becker ed. 1969).
67. See School District v. Scherpp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Cooper v.
Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). See generally J.PELTASON, FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY
MEN:

SOUTHERN

FEDERAL

JUDGES

AND

SCHOOL

DESEGREGATION

(1961);

Van Alstyne, Constitutional Separation of Church and State: The Quest
for a Coherent Position,57 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 865 (1963).
68. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218 (1967). See generally Alpert, The Right to Counsel at Lineup,
4 CRim. L. BULL. 385 (1968).
69. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
70. Id. at 235.
71. Stovall v.Denno, 388 U.S.293 (1967).
72. Id. at 299.
73. Id. at 303 (dissenting opinion).
74. Id. at 304 (dissenting opinion).
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In the lineup cases the Warren Court dealt with several
closely related questions involving the scope of the right to
75
the Court recounsel. Besides its restriction on retroactivity,
fused to extend the constitutional guarantee of the right to counsel to such "scientific" procedures as the taking of handwriting
samples, 78 and the analyses of a defendant's blood, fingerprints,
clothing and hair.77 The Court denied furthermore that the extension of the assistance of counsel to lineup identifications would
impede effective law enforcement. The presence of counsel according to the Court might in fact prove beneficial to the prosecution by helping to prevent the introduction of improperly obtained
evidence. 78 Despite this assertion and the Court's repetition of its
79
statement in Miranda v. Arizona that it was acting in the absence of legislative protection of procedural rights, these rulings did
not occasion immediate or significant statutory reform. As previously indicated, the response in Congress was to challenge Supreme Court authority by attempting to overrule the interrogation
and lineup identification decisions as they applied to federal
cases.80 Whether this congressional action significantly undermined the prestige or authority of the Warren Court is very
much in doubt, but it did reflect the popular sentiment that too
much had already been done for the criminal suspect.
III.

THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AFTER CONVICTION

On March 18, 1963, the date of its ruling in Gideon v. Wain2
wright,"' the Warren Court held in Douglas v. California that
appointed
an indigent defendant is constitutionally entitled to
counsel on the first appeal of his conviction, where that appeal is
recognized as a matter of right. Emphasis on the right of the poor
to adequate appellate review appeared at least as early as 1956
when, in Griffin v. Illinois,8 3 it was held that the due process
and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment barred
a state from denying appellate review solely because of a defend84
In the years
ant's inability to pay for a transcript of the record.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
Pub. L.

Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966).
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967).
Id. at 238.
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of June 19, 1968,
No 90-351, tit. II, § 3501, 82 Stat. 210.

81.

372 U.S. 335 (1963).

82.

372 U.S. 353 (1963).

83.

351 U.S. 12 (1956).

84. For a recent enlargement of the principle established in Griffin,
see Williams v. Oklahoma City, 395 U.S. 458 (1969).

since the Douglas case the Supreme Court has given substantial
attention to the minimal requirements of effective representation
on appeal. On more than one occasion it has recognized that the
function of an attorney at the appellate stage is that of advocate,
and not of amicus curiae.85 The Supreme Court has expressed
concern for the certainty of the appointment of counsel and for the
quality of his representation.
With reference to the certainty of the appointment of counsel, a unanimous Supreme Court held in 1967 that the Missouri
Supreme Court's failure to appoint counsel to represent a defendant on appeal violated his constitutional rights, even though there
was some doubt that he had requested an attorney. 6 Although
the defendant was represented by appointed counsel at trial, his
attorney withdrew from the case after filing a motion for a new
trial and a notice of appeal. In a per curiam opinion the United
States Supreme Court reemphasized the important role played by
appellate counsel. Even though the defendant had not clearly
requested counsel at the appellate stage, the Court refused to
assume that he had thereby waived his rights. 87
A few weeks later the Court in Anders v. California," divided
six-three in holding that on his first appeal an indigent is entitled
to an appointed lawyer who, as an advocate, is required to "support his client's appeal to the best of his ability."8 9 The California
District Court of Appeal had appointed counsel to represent Charles Robert Anders on his first appeal. The lawyer notified the
court by letter that he had reached the conclusion that the appeal
was without merit. 90 After the state court's denial of his request
for another attorney, Anders conducted his own appeal. His conviction was affirmed, and six years later the same court denied
his application for habeas corpus. In the Supreme Court majority opinion reversing the state court denial of the habeas corpus application, Mr. Justice Clark maintained that counsel could
and should have done more to represent his client's interests. His
conclusion was, however, tempered by the following condition:
[I] f counsel finds his case to be wholly frivolous, after a
conscientious examination of it, he should so advise the
court and request permission to withdraw. That request
85.

See Entsminger v. Iowa, 386 U.S. 748 (1967); Hardy v. United

States, 375 U.S. 277 (1964); Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674 (1958).
See generally Note, The Obligation of Appointed Legal Counsel to Represent an Indigent on Appeal, 17 DRAKE L. Rzv. 210 (1968).

86.

Swenson v. Bosler, 386 U.S. 258 (1967).

87. Id. at 260.
88. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).

89. Id. at 744.
90 This procedure was later approved by the California Supreme
Court in In re Nash, 61 Cal. 2d 491, 393 P.2d 405, 39 Cal. Rptr. 205 (1964).
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must, however, be accompanied by a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal."'
not counsel,
The thrust of this requirement was that the court, and
92
should decide "whether the case is wholly frivolous.
Mr. Justice Stewart, in a dissenting opinion 93 supported by Mr.
Justice Black and Mr. Justice Harlan, observed that the majority's
new requirement rested on the assumption that an appointed lawyer's statement in a no-merit letter could not be trusted. He rejected this assumption and insisted that the Court's recommended
procedure was no better than that already followed in California.
"The fundamental error in the majority opinion," he concluded,
was "its implicit assertion that there can be a single inflexible
answer to the difficult problem of how to accord equal protection
to indigent appellants in each of the fifty states."9 4 Obviously this
aspect of federalism, if not altogether ignored by the majority, was
regarded as no major limitation on the scope of fourteenth amendment rights in this area.
Thus far the Supreme Court's concern with the effectiveness
of appellate counsel has not resulted in the prescription of detailed
requirements comparable to the Miranda rules. The Court has
not become involved in the dispute over the relative merits of the
Perhaps this sort
assigned counsel and public defender systems.9
of controversy is outside the scope of comprehensive Supreme
Court surveillance. The appointment of counsel in federal cases
is controlled by the Criminal Justice Act of 1964,96 itself apparently a response to such cases9 7 as Gideon v. Wainwright" and
Douglas v. California.9 Some states have also undertaken legislative reform designed to provide greater legal assistance for indi91. 386 U.S. at 744.
92.
93.
94.

Id.
Id. at 745 (dissenting opinion).
Id. at 747 (dissenting opinion).

95.

See generally L. SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN CRIMINAL

CASES IN STATE COURTS (1965). For a comparison of the assigned counsel
and public defender systems see Neubauer, Counsel for Indigents: An
Empirical Examination of the Criminal Court Process (a paper presented
at the 1968 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association,
Washington, D.C., September 7, 1968). See also Shamberg, The Utilization
of Volunteer Attorneys to Provide Effective Legal Services for the Poor, 63
Nw. U. L. REv. 159 (1968).
96. 18 U.S.C. 3006A (1964).
97. See generally Comment, Implementing Justice: The National Defender Project, 1 VALPARISO U. L. REV. 320 (1967).
98. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
99.

372 U.S. 353 (1963).

gents. 10 0 It is significant that legislators have shown concern for
the procedural rights of indigent defendants at a time of unusual
judicial activity in this area. By contrast with congressional measures directed at police interrogation and related matters, most legislative activity concerning the appointment of counsel at trial and
on appeal has been in harmony with Supreme Court decisions. This
sharp dichotomy in legislative responses may be explained in part
by the fact that the latter areas are much more readily identified
with the adversary system as traditionally understood.
Although the Supreme Court has, since the early 1960's recognized the right to counsel at the "critical" stages of arraignment,
trial and appeal, these earlier decisions do not automatically apply
to all possible intervening stages in the criminal process. In the
1967 case of Mempa v. Rhay,' 0 1 for example, the Warren Court
explicitly recognized for the first time an unrestricted right to
counsel at a post conviction hearing at which the trial judge revoked the defendant's probation and sentenced him to a term of
imprisonment. Speaking for a unanimous Court, Mr. Justice Thurgood Marshall pointed out that in the Gideon case there was no
"occasion . . .to enumerate the various stages in a criminal proceeding in which counsel was required."'10 2 However, a number of
earlier cases, decided under the "special circumstances" rationale
of Betts v. Brady,10 8 made it clear, in the light of Gideon, "that
appointment of counsel for an indigent is required at every stage of
a criminal proceeding where substantial rights of a criminal accused may be affected.' 0 4 The Court's ruling was confined to a
particular type of postconviction proceeding, but Mr. Justice Marshall's language indicated a willingness to implement this protection on a broad scale.
A year later the Warren Court gave the Mempa decision retroactive application. 05 Noting that "decisions on a criminal defendant's right to counsel at trial, [citation omitted] at certain arraignments, [citation omitted] and on appeal [citation omitted] "106
had also been given retroactive application, the Court found that
the assistance of counsel "at sentencing is no different. 1 0 7 Here
the right "must . . . be treated like the right to counsel at other
100. See Comment, Gideon and Beyond: Achieving an Adequate Defense for the Indigent, 59 J. CIRM. L.C. & P.S. 73 (1968).
101. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
102. Id. at 134.
103. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
104. 389 U.S. at 134.
105. McConnell v. Rhay, 393 U.S. 2 (1968); cf. Arsenault v. Massachusetts, 393 U.S. 5 (1968) (in which an unanimous Supreme Court gave
retroactive application to the requirement that counsel be provided an indigent at the "critical" stage of arraignment); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S.

59 (1963).
106.
107.

393 U.S. at 3.
Id.
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stages of adjudication."108 The Court's reference to "adjudication"
might indicate its standard for differentiating between decisions
applied retroactively and those given only prospective effect. The
10 9
United
latter group includes such cases as Miranda v. Arizona,
0
States v. Wade," and Mapp v. Ohio,"' in which the exclusionary
rule implementing the fourth amendment was applied to the states
through the fourteenth amendment. 112 Each of these cases involved the exercise of constitutional rights prior to the beginning
of formal adjudicative proceedings. Thus, while the Warren Court
was willing in the interrogation and lineup cases to give new
dimensions to the adversary system, it was obviously not prepared
to erase all formal distinctions between proceedings in the courtroom and criminal investigation by the police. It is also possible
that refusal to apply these decisions retroactively turned in part
on the Court's recognition of the hostility that they aroused among
most law enforcement officers. No fully satisfactory explanation
emerges, however, for holding that a single constitutional guarantee, such as the right to counsel, is given broader application in
one area than in another. Although the Supreme Court has not
decided questions of retroactivity in terms of the broad requirements of due process, it seems to have been concerned with the
basic fairness of proceedings-the essence of the due procss requirement."'
IV.

OTHER DIMENSIONS OF THE

ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

In addition to the areas previously covered, the Supreme Court
has in recent years examined a variety of situations in which the
right to counsel received prominent, but not exclusive attention.
In most of these situations the Court has enlarged the scope of
the right, but a few restrictions have been established. For example, in Schmerber v. California"4 it was held that the defendant's constitutional rights including the right to counsel, were not
violated by a compulsory blood test and use of the evidence thus
obtained. By a five-four margin the Warren Court, through Mr.
Justice Brennan, refused to extend the prohibition against selfincrimination to "real or physical," as opposed to "testimonial"
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
342 U.S.
114.

Id. at 4.
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
388 U.S. 218 (1967).
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Id.
Cf. Briethaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957); Rochin v. California,
165 (1952).
384 U.S. 757 (1966).

evidence. According to the Court, Schmerber had "no greater
right" merely because his lawyer "erroneously advised him that
he could assert it."' "
The rationale of the decision was that
counsel could assist the defendant only in the exercise of rights
that the defendant clearly possessed.
In 1966 the Warren Court considered the question of whether
defense counsel had the authority to enter a guilty plea "inconsistent with his client's expressed desire.""' 6 At issue was the
defendant's constitutional right to a trial at which he could confront and cross-examine witnesses against him. The Court held
that in such circumstances a defendant's constitutional rights "cannot be waived by his counsel ....

".
"I

Since most criminal con-

victions are based on guilty pleas and not on jury verdicts, the
decision has far-reaching implications." 8 It is perhaps significant
that, in a context other than the assistance of counsel on appeal,
the Warren Court again indicated concern for the way in which
counsel performs his duties. 119
Not all right-to-counsel problems involve indigent defendants,
as the Supreme Court recognized in another 1966 decision.1 20 Ten
years before, Walter F. Tellier had paid legal expenses in the course
of a successful federal prosecution charging him, among other
things, with a violation of the Securities Act of 1933.121

On his

income tax return for 1956, he attempted to deduct these expenses.
The commissioner of internal revenue and the tax court refused
to allow the deduction, but they were overruled by a United States
Court of Appeals, whose decision in turn was affirmed by the
United States Supreme Court. Mr. Justice Stewart, for a unanimous Court, declined "to distort the income tax laws to serve a
purpose for which they were neither intended nor designed by
Congress. 1 22 Tellier had incurred legal expenses as a result of
exercising his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel. No
reason existed for distinguishing them from other ordinary business expenses as defined by federal law.
The dimensions of the constitutional right to counsel transcend ordinary criminal proceedings. 23 This point is well illus115. Id. at 765.
116. Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1966).
117. Id. at 7.
118. It has been estimated that "up to nine out of ten convictions on
serious charges are based on the defendant's admission of his guilt by a
plea in court." Rosett, The Negotiated Guilty Plea, 374 ANNALS 70, 71
(1967). See also THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY, A REPORT
BY

THE PRESIDENT'S

COMMISSION

ON LAW

ENFORCEMENT

AND ADMINISTRA-

TION OF JUSTICE 134-37 (1967).

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Cf. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966).
15 U.S.C. 77a-aa (1964).
383 U.S. at 695.
See Holt v. Virginia, 381 U.S. 131 (1965), in which the Supreme

Assistance of Counsel and the Warren Court
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

trated by the Warren Court's extension of the counsel requirement to juvenile delinquency proceedings. 124 Writing in 1966, Mr.
Justice Fortas indicated the Court's awareness of widespread irregularities in the juvenile area:
While there can be no doubt of the original laudable purpose of juvenile courts, studies and critiques in recent
years raise serious questions as to whether actual performance measures well enough against theoretical purpose
to make tolerable the immunity of the process from the
125
reach of constitutional guarantees applicable to adults.
A year later, with its landmark decision in In re Gault,126 the
Warren Court directly confronted the problem of counsel in juvenile proceedings.
At the age of fifteen Gerald Gault was committed to the Arizona State Industrial School for a maximum of six years. 127 His
commitment was apparently based solely on a neighbor's complaint
that she had received an obscene telephone call. The case was
characterized by a number of glaring procedural irregularities.
Initially, Gerald was taken into custody without notice to his parents. Furthermore, the neighbor who made the allegation respecting the telephone call did not appear to testify at either of
the two juvenile court hearings held prior to his commitment. No
other witnesses were sworn and no permanent record was kept at
these hearings. The boy was not advised of his right to remain
silent, and neither he nor his parents were notified of his right
to retained or appointed counsel.
Speaking again for the majority, Mr. Justice Fortas declared
that the juvenile delinquency proceeding that characterized the
Gault case violated the due process requirement. According to
this decision, due process requires (1) written notice of the charge
or allegations, 28 (2) notice to the child and his parents of his
right to counsel, 129 (3) application of the privilege against selfincrimination, 30 and (4) the right of confrontation and cross-examCourt broadened its recognition of the right to counsel in contempt proceedings.
124. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
125. Id. at 555.
126. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); cf. In re Whittington, 391 U.S. 341
(1968).
127. In the words of the juvenile court order he was committed "for
the period of his minority [that is until twenty-one], unless sooner discharged by due process." 387 U.S. at 7-8 (bracketed material by the

Court).

128. 387 U.S. at 31.
129. Id. at 34.
130. Id. at 42.

ination.' 31 Mr. Justice Fortas outlined the history of the juvenile
court movement and critically evaluated the assumptions underlying it. He reasoned that in theory the state, as parens patriae,
serves as the child's protector, not as his prosecutor, thus permitting the exercise of maximum discretion by juvenile court
authorities. In practice, however, he pointed out that the results
have been far from satisfactory: "Juvenile court history has again
demonstrated that unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure." 13 2 Reflecting the Court's sharp disapproval of the proceedings revealed by the record, Mr. Justice Fortas asserted that,
"Under our Constitution, the condition of being a boy does not
justify a kangaroo court."' 133 He saw no essential difference between commitment to the state industrial school and commitment
to prison. On the contrary, according to Mr. Justice Fortas this
case differed from a criminal prosecution only in that greater
procedural safeguards were available in the latter. Had Gerald
Gault been over eighteen and tried as an adult for the alleged
offense, the opinion noted "the maximum punishment would have
been a fine of $5.00 to $50.00 or imprisonment in jail for not more
13 4
than two months.'
While there was much disagreement among those voting for
reversal, 135 only Mr. Justice Stewart dissented entirely from the
Gault ruling. 136 He recognized the existence of "serious problems"
in this area but was sure that they would not be solved by the
Court's conversion of "a juvenile proceeding into a criminal prosecution. 1 27 Irrespective of the possible advantages or shortcomings of the Gault decision, its implications seem to be as farreaching as those of Gideon and Miranda In this single ruling a
number of guarantees, implicit in the concept of due process of law,
were applied to a system which, for more than half a century, was
assumed to be outside the criminal process normally associated with
those rights. The central role of the assistance of counsel in the
exercise of other procedural rights here, as elsewhere, is apparent. In its absence the privilege against self-incrimination and the
right of confrontation and cross-examination would be of little
value.' 3 8
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 29.

135. Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice White wrote separate concurring
opinions. Id. at 59, 64. Mr. Justice Harlan wrote an opinion concurring
in part and dissenting in part. Id. at 65.
136. 387 U.S. at 78 (dissenting opinion).
137. Id. at 79 (dissenting opinion).
138. Cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Pointer v. Texas,

380 U.S. 400 (1965).
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V.

CONCLUSION

As the foregoing discussion suggests, post-Gideon decisions of
the Warren Court in the right-to-counsel area share no single common theme. Nevertheless, several related factors are apparent in
most of them, thus permitting some tentative generalizations. One
such factor is the firm commitment to protection of the rights of
indigents. This concern, of course, is by no means of recent origin.
Poverty was one of the disadvantages shared by most defendants
in the early right-to-counsel and coerced confession cases of the
1930's.1"9 In those days, however, the Supreme Court focused its
attention on the basic requirements of a fair trial, examining other
stages in the criminal process only in the broad context of such
requirements. Decisions of the Warren Court gave far more specific attention to the plight of the indigent suspect almost from the
moment of his arrest forward. It has been estimated that each
year at least 150,000 persons who cannot afford to pay for legal
assistance are charged with felonies in state courts. 140 Accordingly, the dimensions of the problem with which the Warren Court
attempted to deal are far greater than a handful of decisions might
suggest. The Court during this period did not precisely identify
the criteria by which, for constitutional purposes, a defendant may
be classified as an indigent. 141 Many persons, not treated by trial
courts as indigents can afford only partial payment of the expenses likely to be incurred during criminal proceedings. The Supreme Court has shown some inclination to deal with the question
of effective representation by defense counsel in other contexts.
Despite changes in the Court's personnel, it would not be surprising
if some attention were given eventually to the problem of the defendant who cannot afford competent counsel but who at present does not fall into the category of individuals protected by the
Gideon v. Wainwrightl42 and Douglas v. California'4 s rulings.
In expanding the assistance of counsel and related constitutional provisions, the Warren Court focused critical attention
139. Cf. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936); Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45 (1932). In these early cases most defendants were uneducated
Negroes, tried in Southern states and often confronted with the threat of
mob violence. The Court's recent concern for indigent defendants has
transcended racial and sectional lines.
140. L. SILVERsmIN, DEF'NSE OF THE POOR IN CRIMINAL CASES IN
STATE CouRTs 7-8 (1965).
141. For a suggestion of willingness to consider this question see
Wood v. United States, 389 U.S. 20 (1967).
142. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
143. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).

during the post-Gideon period mainly on police procedures.144 A
majority of the Justices apparently assumed that the adversary
system was threatened by a sharp procedural disparity between
police methods and formal adjudication. They further assumed
that the proper way to resolve this difficulty was to convert at
least part of the investigatory process into something approaching
the adversary system, but not on the other hand, to accommodate
the adversary system to the alleged demands of criminal investigation. It should be noted that at least one important element of
the adversary system, namely the presence of a judicial officer, a
neutral third party standing between the prosecutor, as represented by the police, and defense counsel, is still missing from
police interrogation and lineup identification, even where the Warren Court's rulings are faithfully followed. In the confrontation
between officer and attorney, furthermore, the likely deficiency
of legal knowledge on the part of the former further distorts the
analogy between these preliminary stages and a formal adversary
proceeding. Nevertheless, it seems unwarranted to assume that an
attorney under such circumstances would abandon the adversary role that he is accustomed to filling in the courtroom. It is
doubtful that, even if fully implemented, the Miranda requirements would remove the danger of undue police pressure against
a suspect. Nothing short of an automatic requirement that interrogation be made public could achieve this objective. Given
the bitter denunciation of its efforts merely to modify the conditions of private interrogation, even the Warren Court could not
have been expected to take this step. The same difficulty does
not necessarily apply to lineup identificaton where the police are
seeking statements from individuals not in custody. A fundamental
question applicable to this entire area is whether investigative
techniques can conform to the procedures of an accusatorial system and at the same time continue to be relatively effective.
Conversely, it may be asked whether criminal investigation can
depart from procedural requirements, as it obviously has on many
occasions, without destroying the integrity of the adversary system of criminal justice.
In addition to its concern for constitutional standards of criminal law enforcement, the Warren Court questioned the fairness of
procedures within the juvenile court system.

decision left many questions
cant that the Court did not
plicitly in subsequent cases.
Burger Court 48 will apply
144.

The In re Gault145

unanswered and it is perhaps significhoose to deal with them more exOf course, the extent to which the
constitutional requirements in this
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complex area remains in doubt. That the Gault case represents
a major commitment to broad standards of due process, however,
is beyond serious question. By contrast with juvenile delinquency
proceedings, the Warren Court gave almost no attention to shortcomings in the formal criminal process, for example, the problem
of prosecution-oriented trial judges. 147 Such attention might have
compelled critical examination of a number of assumptions underlying the adversary system itself. This appraisal would have
been difficult, particularly in view of the Warren Court's apparent belief that expanded application of the adversary system could
remedy procedural abuses in other stages of the criminal process.
Whether, in the final analysis, the pressure of public opinion,
the negative response of Congress, or changes in judicial personnel
will influence a shift in the direction of constitutional development is, of course, a matter of speculation. It is true that after the
close of its 1966-1967 term, the Warren Court attempted no enlargements of the right to counsel comparable to Miranda v. Arizona,148 United States v. Wade, 149 Anders v. California,'50 or In
re Gault."" However, considering the scope of expansion between 1964 and 1967, perhaps a slackened pace was to be expected.
Certainly there is no conclusive evidence that the Court yielded to
public pressure in this area. Indeed, during 1968 and 1969, it
reaffirmed and sharpened the Miranda requirements and broadened the scope of other constitutional provisions, notably in the
152
areas of search and seizure and double jeopardy.
In all likelihood the Burger Court will have an opportunity to
consider the constitutionality of congressional measures purporting
to overrule the Miranda and Wade requirements as applied to
federal law enforcement. Such a constitutional test would raise
intriguing and often embarrassing questions about the ambiguous relationship between the judiciary and other branches of
government in the realm of constitutional interpretation. It is too
easy to forget that Congress and the President also play active parts
in shaping the basic law. Obviously, the Constitution, despite
orable Warren E. Burger as Chief Justice of the United States, June 23,
1969, to present.

147. Supreme Court concern with this issue in its broadest dimensions

is not, however, unprecedented. Cf. Tuney v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
148. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
149. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
150. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
151. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
152. See Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969); Mathis v. United States,
391 U.S. 1 (1968); cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969); Benton

v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S 752 (1969).

Charles Evans Hughes' famous phrase, is not always "what the
judges say it is." Our governmental system has, however, usually
operated under the assumption that constitutional adjudication has
a right of finality, especially when it culminates in a full-opinion
decision of the United States Supreme Court. Accordingly, even
those justices who have criticized the interrogation and lineup
identification decisions might refuse to endorse the nullification of
those decisions via congressional enactment. Such direct subordination of the Supreme Court to Congress would pose difficulties
even for many advocates of judicial self-restraint. Traditional regard for the independence and stature of the Supreme Court might
in this situation overshadow intracourt disagreement on narrower
questions of constitutional law and public policy.
Another factor may also operate to minimize further departures from controversial decisions of the Warren Court. Mounting evidence indicates that recent decisions have had a minimal
impact on law enforcement. They have by no means had the
devastating effect widely prophesied by an array of critics. Neither
have they put an end, however, to the procedural abuses against
which they were directed. Thus, for proponents as well as critics,
these rulings may come to appear far less crucial over the next
few years. The Supreme Court might even adopt new approaches
to problems of law enforcement without formally abandoning its
earlier guidelines.
Outside the areas of criminal investigation and juvenile court
proceedings, recent extensions of the right to counsel have aroused
little controversy. This is true even though several rulings call
for major changes in the adversary proceeding as traditionally
understood in this country. There is little reason to believe that
the Supreme Court will suddenly lose interest in the quality not
to mention the certainty, of legal defense in the courtroom. Moreover, the Supreme Court might have occasion to look more closely
at such widespread practices as plea bargaining and in time to
formulate constitutional standards applicable to this and related
aspects of the informal contact between defense attorney and
prosecutor.
It will be remembered that in its most widely criticized decisions the Warren Court was sharply divided. Mr. Justice Stewart
and Mr. Justice White, usually joined by Mr. Justice Harlan, dissented from the interrogation and identification rulings. 153 From
a purely quantitative standpoint, two or three changes in Supreme
Court membership could convert this minority into a majority.
In addition to personnel changes, however, numerous variables
influence the course and tempo of constitutional change. The
153. They were joined in the Escobedo and Mirandacases by Mr. Justice
Clark. It appears that Mr. Justice Clark's successor, Mr. Justice Marshall,
is aligned with the Miranda majority.
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nuances of particular cases, further refinement of the techniques
of law enforcement, and subtle shifts in public attitudes suggest
some of the more apparent variables. It is by no means certain,
furthermore, that justices who dissented from a particular decision
two or three years ago will automatically vote to overrule it at the
first opportunity. Also it is not uncommon for new appointees
to modify their views once they come into close contact with those
already on the Court. Irrespective of the course of future decisions,
much of what the Supreme Court has already said about the constitutional requirement of counsel has not yet been implemented.
While it is recognized that implementation is not the only standard
by which to evaluate Supreme Court performance, the question
remains whether major decisions of the Warren Court requiring
representation by counsel will eventually come to represent something more than distant, unrealized ideals.
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